

Training course on economic reintegration of
children and youth associated with armed
forces or armed groups

Turin, 6-10 February 2012

Template for country presentations


(post) conflict situation in SOMALIA

	Somaliland	Puntland	South-Central Somalia
Fragility level	Fragile	Post-conflict	Conflict
Political situation	Aims to achieve independence Elected government (2009) lead by Silanyo ex-SNM Introduced multi-party system in 2011	Elected government (2010) lead by Farole (his son is openly linked to piracy)	Weak UN/int. community supported TFG Al-Shabaab, ASWJ, and other independent states
Economical situation	Own currency Nat. Bank Nat income from livestock trade to the Middle East Remittances Informal private sector	Nat income from general trade (Bossasso) and piracy ransom Remittances Informal private sector	Huge inflation Nat income from UN/int. community Remittances
Armed parties using children below 18	Clan militias e.g. Taleh 2 Private company militia	Clan militia Freelance militia SSC Nat. army Galgala insurgents Pirates	Clan militia Freelance militia ASWJ Al-shabaab TFG Himan and Heeb forces Pirates

The use of children/youth in armed conflict

Causes of recruitment	Lack of alternative opportunities, education, government authority and protection; strong clan affiliation and protection; general radicalization; social status (masculinity); forced recruitment
Circumstances in which they released	SSC: (1) Self-demobilization (mainly AS, ASWJ) – gathered into TFG run camp (Marino camp) SL/PL/SSC: (2) Offered amnesty by the government in SSC/PL (3) Offered amnesty by the MoI/MoS but no legal framework yet (Law 63 in SL) (4) Alternative sentencing – parole/probation pilot in SL and PL in the framework of Youth at-Risk / Youth for Change project
Approximate proportion	Official process in SSC 1000 (UNICEF under 18) Self-demobilize 3000 in the whole Somalia (2011)
Re-recruitment	Especially into clan and freelance militia Official armies e.g. TFG Lack of prevention effort by the governments and aid agencies (first in its kind is the Youth at-Risk project)

Number of armed groups by category



Proportion of groups including children (<18) = **62%**

Youngest members = **10 years old**, but average around **14 years old**, all in Mogadishu

Youth (18-30) associated with armed forces or armed groups

Main characteristics of above 18	<p>(Data extracted via Youth-SMS software)</p> <p><u>Education</u>: approx 30% illiterate; 30% semi-illiterate</p> <p><u>Health</u>: 4% disabled in SL/PL</p> <p><u>Family situation</u>: 10% married; 30% orphan</p> <p><u>Attitude/behavior</u>: criminal youth mainly opportunistic in SL and PL</p> <p><u>Community acceptance</u>: not yet assessed/ quantified but specific image creating projects in within the social reintegration</p>
Main challenges to reintegration	<ul style="list-style-type: none">- No legal framework yet- Short term economical / social opportunities- Lack of conducive environment- Lack of culture of peace- Continuous crime/violence/conflict- Stigmatization of women- Managing expectations
Skills vs school	<ul style="list-style-type: none">- Majority want to learn skills and work


Children (under 18) associated with armed forces or armed groups

Children to be reintegrated	SL: 350 (2011/12); PL: 350 (2011/12); SSC: 500 (2004 – 2012) Only males; possibilities for extending to SSC
Main characteristics of under 18	<ul style="list-style-type: none">- Little to no education given lack of infrastructure- High numbers of street children, IDPs and other vulnerable youth- Lower proportion of those formerly associated with armed groups- Information that under 18s are target of recruitment
Main challenges to reintegration	<ul style="list-style-type: none">- Desensitization of violence through 20 years of violence- In Islam, 15 years constitutes adulthood- Children in current programs do not have access to economic aspects of reintegration- Lack of long-term educational support
Skills vs school	<ul style="list-style-type: none">- SL: almost as many want education as those who want skills and jobs- Many under 18 have aspirations of starting their own businesses

Reintegration of children/youth

Most youth have been reintegrated so far into **urban** environments

- Traditional DDR did / does **NOT** work in Somalia
- Alternative approach, which should not be alone standing but **part of the wider community safety that supports stabilization**
- Should be supplemented with **community based policing and firearm registration**
- Transforms into continuous **alternative sentencing**
- **Bottom up – top down meet in the middle at regional level**



Evidence-based programming:

Youth at-Risk/Youth for Change programme

Goal: Improve Safety & Security at the Community Level

Strategic Components:

- 1. *Decentralized Partnership*** between the Community and the State Security Sector;
2. Sustainability ensured through ***Economic Integration*** coupled with ***Peace & Social Transformation***;
3. Link Security to longer-term development and stabilization;
4. Alternative Sentencing Probation / Parole mechanism

Target beneficiaries

700 Children & 1300 Adults Associated with Violence



**Hard
Criminals**

Target Groups


Youth in Community

Target groups:


- 1. Former Armed Group Members (i.e. defectors);**
- 2. Disenfranchise Children and Youths through community referral from Criminal Groups;**
- 3. Individual Delinquent** within the Community.
- 4. Youth in prison** for petty crime or disciplinary reasons (Parole Mechanism);
- 5. Alternative sentencing - Youth via Police** youth awaiting criminal court charge (Probation Mechanism);

Process

Community Safety Mechanism



Economic Integration Curriculum



END